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Abstract
Background: In healthcare facilities, conventional surveillance techniques using rule-based guidelines may result in
under- or over-reporting of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) outbreaks, as these guidelines are
generally unvalidated. The objectives of this study were to investigate the utility of the temporal scan statistic for
detecting MRSA clusters, validate clusters using molecular techniques and hospital records, and determine significant
differences in the rate of MRSA cases using regression models.
Methods: Patients admitted to a community hospital between August 2006 and February 2011, and identified with
MRSA > 48 hours following hospital admission, were included in this study. Between March 2010 and February 2011,
MRSA specimens were obtained for spa typing. MRSA clusters were investigated using a retrospective temporal
scan statistic. Tests were conducted on a monthly scale and significant clusters were compared to MRSA outbreaks
identified by hospital personnel. Associations between the rate of MRSA cases and the variables year, month, and
season were investigated using a negative binomial regression model.
Results: During the study period, 735 MRSA cases were identified and 167 MRSA isolates were spa typed. Nine
different spa types were identified with spa type 2/t002 (88.6%) the most prevalent. The temporal scan statistic
identified significant MRSA clusters at the hospital (n = 2), service (n = 16), and ward (n = 10) levels (P ≤ 0.05). Seven
clusters were concordant with nine MRSA outbreaks identified by hospital staff. For the remaining clusters, seven
events may have been equivalent to true outbreaks and six clusters demonstrated possible transmission events.
The regression analysis indicated years 2009–2011, compared to 2006, and months March and April, compared to
January, were associated with an increase in the rate of MRSA cases (P ≤ 0.05).
Conclusions: The application of the temporal scan statistic identified several MRSA clusters that were not
detected by hospital personnel. The identification of specific years and months with increased MRSA rates may
be attributable to several hospital level factors including the presence of other pathogens. Within hospitals, the
incorporation of the temporal scan statistic to standard surveillance techniques is a valuable tool for healthcare
workers to evaluate surveillance strategies and aid in the identification of MRSA clusters.
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Background
In the healthcare setting, the timely identification of
healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) and the institu-
tion of infection control measures are crucial steps for
the prevention and reduction of transmission events
and outbreaks in the patient population. However, the
detection of transmission events is based on limited
evidence [1], and detection of specific pathogen clusters
is generally subjective in nature [2]. Furthermore, even
well-established infection prevention strategies can be
often disregarded [3] at various levels. Overall, these
factors may lead to the transmission of pathogens
within the hospital, a missed opportunity to investigate
a disease cluster, or false ascertainment of a cluster
resulting in the misuse of hospital resources for investi-
gational purposes [2]. Statistical methods, such as the
scan statistic, may enhance the identification of disease
clusters and/or outbreaks in the hospital setting [2,4].
The scan statistic [5] can be used to detect and evaluate
clusters of infectious diseases in space, time, and/or
space-time [6-8]. By understanding the clustering of
infectious diseases spatially and/or temporally, potential
risk factors can be identified [9], detailed investigations
determining the association between exposures and dis-
ease interventions can be facilitated [10], and outbreaks
can be detected [6].
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
outbreaks in healthcare facilities represent a significant
burden to public health in terms of ward closures,
infection control measures, increased patient morbid-
ity and mortality rates, and healthcare costs [11,12]. In
hospitals, identification of outbreaks is routinely based
on the examination of microbiological test results and
patients’ charts [4], with the definition of an outbreak
generally relying on rule-based criteria [2]. However,
these types of criteria are prone to error since they
fail to address changes in population size or random
variation [2]. With the increasing availability of timely
surveillance data within the hospital setting, the use of
analytical methods may lead to the earlier detection
of disease clusters or outbreaks [13]. In hospitals, the
incorporation of the scan statistic for the detection of
MRSA disease clusters, spatially and/or temporally, has
been limited. In one study, a space-time permutation scan
statistic was utilized to detect clusters throughout the
hospital [2]. However, molecular data were not collected
to validate MRSA clusters. In another investigation, a
temporal scan statistic, incorporating molecular data,
was employed to identify MRSA clusters which were
used as a gold standard to evaluate other algorithms for
cluster detection [4]. For both investigations, the appli-
cation of a scan statistic to hospital data resulted in the
identification of several significant MRSA clusters that
were not identified by hospital personnel. However, as
both studies were conducted in academic medical cen-
tres, further investigation of the scan statistic for identi-
fying MRSA clusters under different healthcare settings
is required [2,4].
The objectives of this study were to investigate the
utility of the temporal scan statistic for detecting MRSA
clusters in a community hospital and to validate signifi-
cant clusters using molecular techniques and hospital
records concerning known MRSA outbreaks; and to
determine if there were significant differences in the
rate of MRSA infection and colonization cases by month,
season, and year using regression models.
Methods
Study site
Located in southern Ontario, Canada, the participating
study hospital has 345 beds, over 200,000 in- and out-
patient visits annually, and provides an array of ser-
vices including internal medicine, surgery, emergency,
pediatrics, oncology, rehabilitation, intensive care,
and psychiatry. Both urban and rural populations are
served by this facility. This study was approved by the
research ethics boards of the University of Guelph and
the participating hospital. The research ethics approval
covered all aspects of the study including the collec-
tion of de-identified isolates from the hospital’s micro-
biology laboratory.
Surveillance
In the study hospital, targeted surveillance for MRSA is
conducted based on recommendations provided by a
Provincial Infectious Diseases Advisory Committee [14].
Briefly, during the study period, at the time of hospital
admission, patients identified as having an increased risk
for MRSA acquisition are screened. These risk factors
include [14]:
 Previous colonization or infection with MRSA;
 Time spent in any healthcare facility in the previous
twelve months (time defined as > 12 continuous
hours);
 Recent exposure to a unit/ward/area of a healthcare
facility identified with an MRSA outbreak; or
 Individuals receiving home healthcare or treatment
with an indwelling medical device.
For MRSA detection, specimens are obtained from
the anterior nares and the perineal area (surveillance
sample); and from any skin lesions, wounds, incisions,
ulcers, and exit sites of indwelling devices if present
(surveillance and/or clinical sample) [14].
During an outbreak or for patients located on high risk
units (e.g., intensive care unit), universal admission screen-
ing is conducted. For patients hospitalized for an extended
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period of time, weekly MRSA surveillance cultures are
performed. In addition, for patients identified with in-
dwelling medical devices or wounds, these sites are
monitored by weekly culture. If a patient is identified as
an MRSA contact (i.e., roommate of a patient who is
found to be MRSA positive), the MRSA contact will
have two sets of surveillance cultures taken with at
least one set taken seven days following their last
exposure to the MRSA patient [14]. In the participating
hospital, MRSA cases were classified as healthcare-
associated (HA) if the patient was newly identified with
MRSA (infection or colonization) >48 hours following
hospital admission.
Patient data and isolate collection from the hospital
For a case to be included in this investigation, MRSA
was newly identified between August 1, 2006 and
February 28, 2011 and > 48 hours following hospital
admission. Patients that were identified as being either
infected or colonized with MRSA were included. Only
one MRSA isolation event per patient per admission-
discharge period was included in the analyses. The
admission-discharge period was defined as the time
interval from when a patient was admitted to, and
discharged from, the hospital. Transfer to another
ward within the hospital was not considered a dis-
charge. For a patient to be admitted ≥ 2 times to the
hospital, > 24 hours between the discharge and admission
dates was required. Data from the first bacteriology
report per patient per admission-discharge period were
obtained. Bacteriology reports from MRSA cases located
in the emergency and hemodialysis wards were excluded
as these departments specifically support outpatients.
For MRSA cases identified between March 1, 2010
and February 28, 2011, the hospital’s microbiology
laboratory collected and submitted patient MRSA iso-
lates for molecular typing. In the participating facility,
MRSA was confirmed from surveillance samples using
chromogenic agar (BBL CHROMagar, MRSA, Becton,
Dickinson and Company, Sparks, Maryland, USA), the
penicillin-binding protein 2a latex agglutination test
(MRSA latex agglutination test, Oxoid Ltd., Hants,
UK), and Vitek® 2 (bioMérieux, Marcy-l’Étolie, France)
according to the manufacturers’ instructions. For clinical
samples, S. aureus was confirmed using the gram stain
and the tube coagulase test and MRSA was confirmed
using Vitek® 2. For surveillance and clinical MRSA iso-
lates, a standard panel of antimicrobials was used for
susceptibility testing and included rifampin, clindamy-
cin, trimethoprim and sulfamethoxazole, and van-
comycin. Testing was performed using Vitek® 2 and
results were based on the standards set by the Clinical
and Laboratory Standards Institute [15]. At the hospital
level, all specimens submitted for MRSA testing were
collected at the discretion of medical personnel. Only
one MRSA isolate per patient was collected for molecu-
lar typing.
Data collected from the bacteriology report included
a unique patient identifier, dates pertaining to patient
admission, discharge, and when a specimen was collected
for MRSA testing, the ward location of the patient when
the specimen was obtained, and the antimicrobial sus-
ceptibility profile of the MRSA isolate. For ward loca-
tion, bacteriology reports provided both service and
ward designations. Services were defined as specific
departments (e.g., internal medicine, surgery) whereas
wards were characterized as specific, physically distinct
units that comprised a service (e.g., wards S1 and S2
constituted the surgery service).
Information pertaining to the number of patient days
per month for each service was obtained. For wards,
data on patient days were collected only from those
wards that were operational and provided the same
service for the complete study period (i.e., 55 months).
For descriptive statistics, incidence rates for MRSA
were expressed as the number of MRSA cases per
10,000 patient days.
Data pertaining to known MRSA outbreaks that
occurred during the study period (e.g., start and end
date, ward location, and number of patients involved)
were collected from the hospital’s Infection Preven-
tion and Control (IPC) department. The molecular
identity of MRSA strains involved in previous out-
breaks was not available as this healthcare facility does
not routinely analyze MRSA strains at the molecular
level. In the study hospital, standardized rule-based
criteria to identify MRSA outbreaks are not employed.
Due to the lack of a formal definition, MRSA out-
breaks were identified by hospital personnel based on
an increase in the baseline MRSA rate over a rapid
time period, especially when localized to one patient
care area.
Molecular typing
Patient isolates were obtained from the hospital’s micro-
biology laboratory following MRSA confirmation. Iso-
lates were collected from culture plates using a sterile
culture swab with Stuart’s media and forwarded to the
laboratory at the University of Guelph. Upon arrival,
culture swabs were streaked onto blood agar (Oxoid,
Nepean, Ontario, Canada) and incubated at 35°C, aerobic-
ally, for 24 hours. Colonies were identified as S. aureus
by Gram stain, catalase test, tube coagulase test, and the
S. aureus latex agglutination assay (Pastorex Staph-plus,
Bio-Rad Laboratories Ltd., Mississauga, Ontario, Canada).
The presence of methicillin-resistance was confirmed by
the penicillin-binding protein 2a latex agglutination test
(MRSA latex agglutination test, Oxoid Ltd., Hants, UK).
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Molecular typing of MRSA was conducted using se-
quence analysis of the X region of the staphylococcal
protein A gene (spa typing) [16]. Sequences were then
analyzed using two different methodologies; eGenomics
software [17] and the Ridom system [18]. Based on eGe-
nomics, spa types are reported using a numerical system
(e.g., spa type 2) whereas Ridom spa types are reported
using a numerical system preceded by a ‘t’ (e.g., t002).
The spa types were compared to epidemic MRSA
strains that are frequently found in Canada [19]. In
addition, all MRSA isolates were investigated for the
lukF-PV gene encoding the Panton-Valentine leukocidin
(PVL) toxin by real-time PCR [20].
To determine the clustering of spa types, all spa typ-
ing data were imported into BioNumerics (version 6.6;
Applied Maths, Ghent, Belgium) and were analyzed
using the spa typing plug-in tool. A minimum spanning
tree (MST) was constructed using the default distance
bin size of 100%. Only spa types that differed by ≤ 2
repeats were considered to be closely related [21].
Statistical analysis
All bacteriology reports were provided by the hospital
in electronic format. The temporal scan statistic was
performed using SaTScan version 9.0 [5] and all de-
scriptive statistics and model building were conducted
using Stata 11.0 (StataCorp, College Station, Texas,
USA). For all hypothesis tests, a 5% significance level
was applied (α ≤ 0.05), if not stated otherwise.
Statistical model
To evaluate the association between the rate of MRSA
cases in the hospital and the independent variables
year, month, and season, a Poisson regression analysis
was conducted. For the independent variable season,
months were categorized in the following groupings:
winter (January – March), spring (April – June), summer
(July – September), and fall (October – December). The
dependent variable and offset were the number of
MRSA cases and the natural log of the population at
risk (i.e., patient days), respectively, for a particular
month. Due to the hierarchical structure of the data,
MRSA cases nested in wards, a multilevel Poisson
model including a random intercept for ward and a
fixed effect for service, was used to adjust for clustering.
Specifically, the variable service was categorized as
medicine (intensive care, oncology, pediatrics, internal
medicine), surgery, and other (psychiatry, rehabilitation,
hospice, childbirth, nursery).
The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was used
to identify correlations between all independent vari-
ables. Variables with a correlation above 0.8 were investi-
gated for collinearity and the biologically more plausible
variable was retained in the model [22]. Univariable
multilevel Poisson models were fit using marginal like-
lihood estimation via the adaptive quadrature algo-
rithm (as implemented in the xtmepoisson procedure
in Stata) to screen each independent variable with the
dependent variable using a liberal significance level
(α ≤ 0.20). Manual backwards step-wise modeling was
applied to fit a multivariable multilevel Poisson model
to all previously identified significant co-variables. To
assess the significance of the independent variables,
the likelihood ratio test was utilized. Confounding was
evaluated by examining the effect of the removed vari-
ables on the coefficients of the remaining variables. A
variable was considered to be a confounder if it chan-
ged the model coefficients by ≥ 20% [23]. Interaction
terms were examined for all independent variables.
Due to concerns regarding unexplained overdispersion,
the Poisson random effects model was compared to a
negative binomial random effects model using Akaike’s
Information Criteria (AIC). The random effects negative
binomial model allowed the overdispersion parameter to
vary randomly by cluster based on a beta distribution
(using the xtnbreg command in Stata) [24]. The model
with the lowest AIC was selected. Based on the final
multivariable model, contrasts for independent variables
with >2 categories were examined to investigate signifi-
cant differences between any two categories.
Temporal scan statistic
To identify MRSA clusters, the temporal scan statistic
employing a Poisson model was used. The scan statistic
involves a flexible scanning window that gradually moves
across time. The number of observed and expected obser-
vations inside the window is compared to outside the
window, at each time period, with the greatest excess of
observed cases noted [5,13]. Under the null hypothesis, the
expected number of cases in each time period covered by
the scanning window is proportional to its population size;
whereas under the alternative hypothesis, there is an ele-
vated risk within the window as compared to outside the
window [5]. For this investigation, the population size was
defined as the number of patient-days for each service and
ward on a monthly basis. The window identified as least
likely due to chance, is subsequently evaluated by a max-
imum likelihood test with a test decision based on a
Monte-Carlo simulated P-value [5]. Monte Carlo replica-
tions were set at 9999 for this analysis.
To detect MRSA clusters, only periods with high rates
(i.e., a one-tailed test) were scanned. The maximum
temporal window size was set to 50% of the study
period. In addition, the scan test was adjusted for more
likely clusters via an iterative test procedure with the
identified clusters from previous iterations removed
from the data set and a new analysis performed using
the remaining data [5]. Data were analyzed on a monthly
Faires et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2014, 14:375 Page 4 of 14
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/14/375
scale. A cluster was defined as a period where the rate of
MRSA cases was statistically higher than expected inside
a window compared to outside a window.
Retrospective monthly scan tests were conducted for
the entire study period (i.e., August, 2006 to February,
2011) as well as annually (January 1st – December 31st)
from 2006 to 2011. For 2006, the time interval was re-
stricted to August 1st – December 31st and for 2011, the
time interval was limited to January 1st – February 28th.
For each time interval, temporal scan tests were con-
ducted to identify MRSA clusters at three different levels
including hospital wide, services, and wards. For this
analysis, 10 services were identified and included acute
care, complex care, hospice, the intensive care unit,
internal medicine, oncology, pediatrics, psychiatry,
rehabilitation, and surgery. Five wards were identified
and included M1 (internal medicine), S1 (surgery), S2
(surgery), C1 (complex care), and C2 (complex care).
Significant (P ≤ 0.05) clusters that were identified by
the temporal scan statistic were compared to outbreaks
identified by the IPC department. For clusters that were
characterized with molecular data, MRSA cases that
comprised significant clusters were evaluated based on
spa type. Characteristics of significant clusters (e.g., time
frame, observed and expected case numbers, P-value,
and spa type) are reported.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Data on 735 MRSA cases, from 686 patients, were
obtained during the study period. A total of 642 (93.6%)
patients were identified with MRSA during one hospital
admission-discharge period and 44 (6.4%) patients were
identified with MRSA during two or more hospital
admission-discharge periods. For the 686 patients,
51.6% (n = 354) were male and 48.4% (n = 332) were
female. For male patients, ages ranged from 21 months
to 97 years (mean = 72.6 years) and for female patients,
ages ranged from 7 to 100 years (mean = 73.8 years).
The monthly incidence rate of MRSA fluctuated over
the study period (Figure 1) ranging from 2.10 to 24.22
MRSA cases (colonization and infection)/10,000 pa-
tient days with a mean of 9.59 MRSA cases/10,000 pa-
tient days. Summary characteristics of the MRSA
incidence rate per month, year, season, service, and
ward are presented in Table 1. Overall, the highest
incidence rates of MRSA occurred during 2010 and in
2011 (during the first two months in which surveil-
lance data were available). On average, March, April,
and May reported the highest MRSA rates on a
monthly basis. At the service level, the highest MRSA
rates occurred in the surgery, internal medicine, and
hospice departments, whereas, the pediatric depart-
ment reported the lowest MRSA incidence rate in the
hospital.
From March 1, 2010 to February 28, 2011, 267 MRSA
cases were identified and 167 (62.5%) patient isolates
were obtained for spa typing (Table 2). Overall, nine dif-
ferent spa types were identified with spa type 2/t002
(88.6%) the most prevalent. When spa types were cate-
gorized according to the epidemic CMRSA type, the ma-






































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1 Incidence rate of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infections and colonization per month in a community hospital.
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(Table 2). Only one spa type, 93/t026, was classified as
CMRSA-1. All isolates were negative for the PVL toxin
gene.
Based on the MST that was constructed for clustering
spa types (Figure 2), one major group was observed
with seven different spa types reported as being closely
related (i.e., difference is ≤ 2 repeats) to spa type 2/t002.
These closely related spa types all corresponded to
CMRSA-2.
For two or more MRSA isolates found with identical
spa types, antimicrobial susceptibility profiles of spa
types were examined to determine if the molecular find-
ings could be further characterized (Table 3). For spa
types 23/t548, 93/t026, 268/t067, and 387/t653, the anti-
microbial susceptibility profiles were identical between
spa types. For spa type 2/t002, three different antimicro-
bial susceptibility profiles were identified.
Statistical model
A random effects negative binomial model was chosen
over the random effects Poisson model based on the
AIC value. Results from the univariable multilevel nega-
tive binomial models indicated that year and month
were all significantly associated with the rate of MRSA
cases in the hospital [see Additional File 1]. The final
multivariable multilevel negative binomial model indicated
that year and month were significantly associated with the
rate of MRSA cases (Table 4). Interactions between the
variables year and month could not be assessed due to the
number of categories for each independent variable and
the resulting small number of observations per interaction
term. For the independent variable year, years 2009–2011
had MRSA rates that were significantly higher than the
MRSA rates in 2006. Results from model-based contrasts
indicate that years 2009–2011 also had significantly higher
MRSA rates than years 2007 and 2008 (Table 5). In the
final model, the rates of MRSA were also significantly
higher in months March and April compared to January.
Results from model-based contrasts demonstrated that
significant increased MRSA rates were also noted in
March and April compared to June, and for April com-
pared to February.
Temporal scan statistic
Over the study period, the temporal scan statistic identi-
fied statistically significant MRSA clusters at the hospital
(n = 2), service (n = 16), and ward (n = 10) levels (Table 6).
As separate scan tests were performed at various levels, it
was observed that several clusters overlapped in time and
location (i.e., service and wards). Of the 26 clusters identi-
fied at the service and ward levels, 15 were classified as
unique events.
Overall, clusters ranged in duration from 1 to 25 months
(mean = 9.1 months) and involved 6 to 376 patients
Table 1 Summary characteristics of 735 cases of MRSA,
August 1, 2006 - February 28, 2011
MRSA
Characteristics
Incidence rate of MRSA















2006 (August – December) 6.14
2007 (January – December) 7.28
2008 (January – December) 5.97
2009 (January – December) 9.98
2010 (January – December) 16.42
2011 (January – February) 10.49
Season1
Spring (April – June) 10.26
Summer (July – September) 9.56
Fall (October – December) 9.33















M1 (Internal medicine) 23.14
C1 (Complex continuing care) 9.15
C2 (Complex continuing care) 8.78
MRSA =Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
1Incidence rate presented is based on an average for that specific period.
2Incidence rate presented is the total for that specific year.
3Incidence rate presented is the total for that service or ward from August 1,
2006 to February 28, 2011.
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(mean = 43.3) per cluster. Using routine surveillance,
IPC personnel identified nine MRSA outbreaks during
the study period. These outbreaks occurred in five wards
(equivalent to three services), ranged from 2 weeks to
14 months in duration, and involved 4 to 68 patients
(mean = 14) per outbreak. Seven (77.8%) of these previ-
ously known outbreaks were identified as significant
clusters (Cluster ID 6, 19, 20, 22–25) based on the tem-
poral scan statistic. Of the seven events that were iden-
tified by both IPC personnel and the temporal scan
statistic, three clusters (Cluster ID 19, 20, 24) were fur-
ther characterized using molecular data. For all three
clusters, more than one spa type was identified; how-
ever, spa type 2/t002 was the most prevalent MRSA
strain in all three events. For the cluster identified in
ward S1 from July 2009 to February 2011, further inves-
tigation revealed that spa type 387/t653 was identified
in two different patients in November, 2010.
For the remaining MRSA clusters, 11 (52.4%) events
were considered to be of short duration (i.e., 1–6 months
in length) and 10 (47.6%) events were considered to be of
long duration (i.e., 7–25 months in length). Examination
of short duration clusters revealed that seven of the events
(Cluster ID 2, 5, 11, 15, 17, 18, 27) may have been poten-
tial outbreaks as there were considerably large numbers of
MRSA cases detected during a short time span. For two of
these clusters, typing data indicated that spa type 2/t002
was the prevalent MRSA strain identified in the patient
population.
For 10 long duration clusters, seven (Cluster ID 1, 4,
7, 8, 12, 13, 26) were further characterized with molecu-
lar data. For six of these events (Cluster ID 1, 4, 7, 12,
13, 26), several spa types were identified circulating in
the patient population. However, like the short duration
clusters, spa type 2/t002 was the predominant MRSA
strain in all seven events. Further analysis of the long
duration clusters revealed potential transmission of
non-spa type 2 MRSA strains. For the complex care
cluster (Cluster ID 4), spa type 23/t548 was identified
in two different patients, both admitted to the same
ward, in December 2010. In the internal medicine clus-
ter (Cluster ID 7), two patients were identified with
spa type 93/t026, seven weeks apart. For the surgery
cluster (Cluster ID 13), two patients, located in the
same ward, were identified with spa type 387/t653 in
November 2010.
Discussion
In the present investigation, a cluster was defined as a
statistically significant high rate of MRSA cases within a
time period. Using the temporal scan statistic, several
significant MRSA clusters were identified, during the
2006–2011 surveillance period, in a community hospital.
During the same time period, nine MRSA outbreaks
were identified by IPC personnel using standardized
surveillance techniques. However, only seven of these
outbreaks were identified by the temporal scan statis-
tic as significant clusters. This was not surprising, as
others have reported similar results regarding the
discordance between events identified by hospital staff
and the identification of clusters employing a scan
statistic [2,4].
Investigation of the seven outbreaks identified by both
hospital staff and the temporal scan statistic indicated
that five (Cluster ID 19, 20, 23–25) were identified by
the scan test with a starting and/or end date that were
different from the dates provided by IPC personnel.
Specifically, clusters identified by the temporal scan
statistic were one to seven months longer in duration;
consequently, a greater number of MRSA cases per
cluster were identified. For four of the clusters (Cluster
ID 19, 23–25), the temporal scan statistic indicated that
these events occurred prior to dates reported by IPC
personnel. This is an important finding as these events
demonstrate that there may have been a delay in the
institution of infection control strategies. Furthermore,
two of the clusters (Cluster ID 20, 24) were identified as
being longer in duration by the temporal scan statistic;
therefore, premature discontinuation of infection con-
trol measures by IPC personnel may have occurred.
For the two MRSA outbreaks identified by IPC staff
only, one outbreak was located in the intensive care unit
(n = 6 patients, 1 month in duration) and the other out-
break was located in a ward in the internal medicine
department (n = 11 patients, 6 weeks duration). The
outbreak in the intensive care unit was identified by
the temporal scan statistic; however, the cluster was
not significant. For the outbreak identified in the ward
of the internal medicine department, this particular










2 148 (88.6) t002 No 2
23 3 (1.8) t548 No 2
26 1 (0.6) t539 No 2
93 4 (2.4) t026 No 1
228 1 (0.6) t5518 No 2
230 1 (0.6) t010 No 2
268 4 (2.4) t067 No 2
387 4 (2.4) t653 No 2
1178 1 (0.6) t5607 No 2
MRSA =Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
PVL = Panton-Valentine leukocidin.
CMRSA = Canadian epidemic methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
1spa types classified according to eGenomics (http://tools.egenomics.com).
2spa types classified according to the Ridom
system (http://www.spaserver.ridom.de).
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ward was only operational for 27 of the 55 months that
the study was conducted, and therefore, did not meet
the inclusion criteria for a temporal scan test to be
conducted at the ward level. However, temporal scan
tests conducted at the hospital and service (e.g., in-
ternal medicine) levels did not result in the identifica-
tion of a cluster that corresponded in time to the
MRSA outbreak. In the participating healthcare facil-
ity, specific rule-based criteria (e.g., ≥ 3 HA-MRSA
cases in a 2 week period) are not used to establish
MRSA outbreaks. Rather, data pertaining to the num-
ber of MRSA cases and the time period (i.e., number of
days) are used to ascertain if an outbreak exists in the
patient population and if an investigation should be
initiated. This type of surveillance is subjective in
nature and may be prone to under-reporting or over-
reporting of MRSA outbreaks.
Of the 11 short duration (e.g., 1–6 months) clusters
that were identified during this investigation, seven
events were labelled by the investigators as potential
outbreaks due to the large number of MRSA cases iden-
tified over a short time period. However, only two of
these events could be analyzed at the molecular level,
with spa type 2/t002 as the predominant MRSA strain
in each cluster. These molecular findings indicate that
transmission events may have occurred and that these
clusters may have been equivalent to true outbreaks.
For the 10 long duration (e.g., 7–25 months) clusters
identified, their biological relevance is difficult to dis-
cern. These clusters may represent extended outbreaks,
Figure 2 Minimum spanning tree analysis of 167 methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) patient isolates. The size of each
circle is proportional to the number of isolates. Ridom spa types are presented in each circle. Numbers intersecting the black lines indicate the
difference in the number of repeats between connecting circles. Colours refer to the number of MRSA isolates: red > 20, dark blue≤ 5, light blue≤ 2.
Table 3 Antimicrobial susceptibility profiles, based on spa type, from 149* MRSA patient isolates
spa type Number of MRSA isolates Rifampin Clindamycin Trimethoprim and sulfamethoxazole Vancomycin
2 124 Susceptible Resistant Susceptible Susceptible
2 1 Susceptible Resistant Resistant Susceptible
2 9 Susceptible Susceptible Susceptible Susceptible
23 3 Susceptible Resistant Susceptible Susceptible
93 4 Susceptible Resistant Susceptible Susceptible
268 4 Susceptible Resistant Susceptible Susceptible
387 4 Susceptible Resistant Susceptible Susceptible
*Antimicrobial susceptibility profiles are only presented for spa types in which ≥ 2 MRSA isolates were identified.
MRSA =Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
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temporal trends, changes in pathogen characteristics, or
the representation of systematic changes (e.g., cleaning
policies) at the hospital level during the surveillance
period. For many of the long duration clusters, several
non-spa type 2/t002 MRSA strains were identified in the
patient population. These particular MRSA strains may
indicate unique transmission events between patients or
be part of an outbreak, as researchers have documented
the existence of more than one MRSA strain during an
outbreak investigation [25,26]. Alternatively, these
non-spa type 2/t002 strains may represent genetic changes
within the spa gene, such as deletions or duplications of
repeats and point mutations [27], resulting in different spa
types. Based on the MST that was constructed (Figure 2),
six of the spa complexes were closely related to spa type
2/t002 by a difference in one repeat. For MRSA and
S. aureus, research exploring the time required for a
genetic event to occur has been conducted [28-30];
however, results of these investigations are based on
specific strains and specific locations of the genetic
event. Other plausible explanations for observing di-
verse spa types in these clusters include the introduc-
tion of spa types into the hospital via staff, visitors, and
patients which resulted in transmission events, and
healthcare workers and patients that may have been
colonized with variant MRSA strains.
In the study hospital, molecular typing of MRSA iso-
lates is not routinely performed. This was a major limi-
tation of this study, as there was no prior knowledge of
the endemic MRSA strains in this facility. Furthermore,
not all MRSA isolates were collected from the hospital’s
microbiology laboratory for spa typing. Consequently,
the true molecular composition for some clusters is not
known, and it could not be determined if all cases within
clusters were a result of unique transmission events or
part of a true outbreak. Lastly, with the identification
of a predominant spa type circulating in the patient
population, the application of spa typing provided very
little benefit for elucidating transmission events or
recognizing potential outbreaks, especially for long
duration clusters. Although it was not conducted in
this study, the incorporation of whole-genome sequen-
cing may be a viable tool for further elucidating pos-
sible transmission events and identify potential/true
outbreaks in the hospital setting. Whole-genome se-
quencing provides an inventory of the microevolution-
ary changes of a bacterium and can be used to map
genome-wide single-nucleotide polymorphisms, inser-
tions, and deletions to a reference sequence [28].
Furthermore, this typing technique provides the best
discrimination between closely related bacterial iso-
lates in a timely manner [1,29].
For spa types identified with ≥ 2 MRSA isolates,
antimicrobial susceptibility profiles were examined to
Table 4 Multivariable multilevel* negative binomial
regression model of variables associated with the rate of
MRSA cases
Variable Description IRR 95% CI P-value
Year 2006 Referent
2007 1.12 0.73 – 1.72 0.607
2008 0.89 0.57 – 1.39 0.611
2009 1.63 1.08 – 2.46 0.021
2010 2.62 1.76 – 3.89 < 0.001
2011 2.14 1.13 – 4.06 0.020
Month January Referent
February 1.09 0.70 – 1.71 0.689
March 1.63 1.04 – 2.57 0.035
April 1.88 1.22 – 2.91 0.005
May 1.33 0.83 – 2.15 0.234
June 0.89 0.53 – 1.51 0.664
July 1.27 0.79 – 1.06 0.320
August 1.44 0.92 – 2.26 0.111
September 1.37 0.87 – 2.17 0.177
October 1.33 0.84 – 2.10 0.221
November 1.34 0.85 – 2.12 0.207
December 1.42 0.91 – 2.23 0.122
Service Medicine1 Referent
Surgery 0.95 0.30 – 2.96 0.924
Other2 0.42 0.17 – 1.05 0.064
*Random intercept for ward.
MRSA =Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
IRR = Incidence rate ratio.
CI = Confidence interval.
1Included the following departments: intensive care (adult and neonatal),
oncology, pediatrics, and internal medicine.
2Included the following departments: psychiatry, rehabilitation, hospice,
childbirth, and nursery.
Table 5 Significant model-based contrasts between the
rate of MRSA and year and month
Description IRR 95% CI P-value
2009 versus 2007 1.45 1.09 – 1.94 0.011
2009 versus 2008 1.83 1.34 – 2.48 < 0.001
2010 versus 2007 2.34 1.79 – 3.06 < 0.001
2010 versus 2008 2.94 2.20 – 3.92 < 0.001
2010 versus 2009 1.61 1.28 – 2.03 < 0.001
2011 versus 2007 1.91 1.10 – 3.31 0.021
2011 versus 2008 2.39 1.38 – 4.18 0.002
March versus June 1.83 1.12 – 3.00 0.016
April versus February 1.72 1.11 – 2.66 0.015
April versus June 2.11 1.31 – 3.42 0.002
MRSA =Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
IRR = Incidence rate ratio.
CI = Confidence interval.
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Table 6 Statistically significant temporal clusters of MRSA rates, August 1, 2006 - February 28, 2011
Cluster
Number
Cluster Description Date of cluster (year/month/day) Number of MRSA cases Observed/Expected P-value spa type (n)
Hospital wide scans
1 2006-20111 2009/9/1 – 2011/2/28 376 1.55 < 0.001 2(148), 23(3), 26(1), 93(4), 228 (1),
230 (1), 268(4), 387(4), 1178(1)
2 2006-20112,3 2009/3/1 – 2009/4/30 37 1.84 0.038 Not applicable
Service scans
3 Acute care, 2006-20113 2010/3/1 – 2010/6/30 6 7.44 0.007 2(1)
4a Complex care, 2006-20111 2009/2/1 – 2011/1/31 130 1.5 < 0.001 2(43), 23(2), 228(1), 268(1)
5 Intensive care unit, 2006-20112,3 2010/6/1 – 2010/11/30 13 3.06 0.022 2(7), 268(1)
6 Intensive care unit, 2006-20114 2007/10/1 – 2008/1/31 8 4.1 0.038 Not applicable
7b Internal medicine, 2006-20111 2009/10/1 - 2010/12/31 95 2.0 < 0.001 2(37), 93(2), 387(1)
8 Oncology, 2006-20111 2009/12/1 – 2010/12/31 11 3.42 0.002 2(5)
9c Psychiatry, 2006-20111 2006/9/1 – 2008/5/31 47 2.36 < 0.001 Not applicable
10c Psychiatry, 20083 2008/1/1 – 2008/5/31 9 2.16 0.025 Not applicable
11 Rehabilitation, 2006-20112,3,5 2008/7/1 – 2008/7/31 6 6.68 0.035 Not applicable
12 Rehabilitation, 2006-20111 2009/2/1 – 2011/2/28 32 1.57 0.038 2(9), 26(1), 93(1), 268(1)
13d Surgery, 2006-20111,4 2009/9/1 – 2011/2/28 106 1.74 < 0.001 2(40), 23(1), 93(1), 230(1),
268(1), 387(2)
14e Surgery, 2006-20111,4 2008/9/1 – 2009/3/31 31 2.08 0.003 Not applicable
15 Surgery, 20072,3 2007/3/1 – 2007/4/30 9 2.83 0.026 Not applicable
16 Surgery, 20073 2007/8/1 – 2007/10/31 8 3.19 0.002 Not applicable
17f Surgery, 20082,3,4 2008/9/1 – 2008/11/30 18 2.25 0.003 Not applicable
18g Surgery, 20082,3,4 2008/3/1 – 2008/5/31 12 2.32 0.004 Not applicable
Ward scans
19b M1 (Internal medicine),
2006-20114
2010/1/1 – 2010/5/31 26 2.29 0.009 2(6), 93(1)
20d S1 (Surgery), 2006-20114 2009/7/1 – 2011/2/28 70 1.74 < 0.001 2(23), 23(1), 93(1), 268(1), 387(2)
21e S1 (Surgery), 2006-20111 2008/4/1 – 2009/3/31 29 1.96 0.001 Not applicable
22f S1 (Surgery), 20084 2008/10/1 – 2008/10/31 8 3.91 0.010 Not applicable
23g S1 (Surgery), 20084 2008/4/1 – 2008/5/31 10 3.16 0.003 Not applicable



















Table 6 Statistically significant temporal clusters of MRSA rates, August 1, 2006 - February 28, 2011 (Continued)
25e S2 (Surgery), 20084 2008/9/1 – 2008/11/30 7 3.25 0.024 Not applicable
26a C2 (Complex care), 2006-20111 2010/4/1 – 2011/2/28 27 3.09 < 0.001 2(19), 268(1), 1178(1)
27a C2 (Complex care), 20102,3 2010/8/1 – 2010/11/30 17 2.04 0.009 2(14), 268(1)
28a C1 (Complex care), 20093 2009/4/1 – 2009/9/30 11 1.84 0.031 Not applicable
MRSA =Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
n = Number of isolates.
1Long duration cluster (7–25 months in length).
2Clusters are potential outbreaks.
3Short duration cluster (1–6 months in length).
4Cluster was identified as part of a MRSA outbreak identified by Infection Prevention and Control personnel.
5Cluster was also identified in the Rehabilitation department for the 2008 annual analysis.



















determine if differences in antibiograms could provide fur-
ther characterization of clusters. For spa type 2/t002, nine
MRSA isolates were identified as being susceptible to clin-
damycin whereas all other spa type 2/t002 isolates were
resistant. Further investigation of these nine MRSA iso-
lates revealed that three isolates were identified in the
same internal medicine cluster (Cluster ID 7; n = 2 in
May, 2010; n = 1 in December, 2010) and three isolates
were identified in the same surgery cluster (Cluster ID
13; n = 1 in July, 2010; n = 1 in August, 2010; n = 1 in
September, 2010). The identification of identical spa
types and antibiograms in two long duration clusters,
suggests that transmission events among patients, hos-
pital staff, or possibly even the contaminated environ-
ment, may have occurred. For spa types 23/t548, 93/
t026, 268/t067, and 387/t653, it was noted that these
particular spa types had indistinguishable antimicrobial
profiles. This demonstrates that for the identification of
transmission events and the determination of cases as
outbreak or non-outbreak, relying on antibiogram data
may result in inaccurate findings and the misclassification
of cases as MRSA strains that differ genotypically may
display identical antimicrobial susceptibility profiles.
During the study period, the incidence rate of MRSA
fluctuated considerably, with significant increases noted
in years 2009–2011. Starting in December 2008, Ontario
hospitals were required to report the number of newly
acquired HA-MRSA bacteremias on a quarterly basis, to
be posted on a web site that is accessible to the public
[31]. Although the figures are affiliated with bacteremias
only, the public reporting of MRSA did not result in a
dramatic decrease in the overall incidence of MRSA in this
facility, which is in contrast to C. difficile. In September
2008, monthly data on C. difficile infections (CDIs) from
Ontario hospitals were also posted on a publicly accessed
web site [32]. At the participating hospital, a separate
analysis of CDIs demonstrated that in 2006 and 2007,
there were significantly more cases of CDI, compared to
2008 and 2009 (data not shown). It is theorized that the
decrease in C. difficile case rates may be attributable to
hospitals adhering to best practices in C. difficile pre-
vention due to the mandatory public reporting of rates
[33]. It was anticipated that this would also apply to
MRSA; however, this was not observed.
The significant increases in the incidence rate of MRSA
cases in years 2009–2011, based on the final multivariable
model and model-based contrasts, are concordant with
the findings from the temporal scan statistic as approxi-
mately 60% of the clusters identified spanned 2009–2011.
The increase in the MRSA case rate during this time
period may have been due to the presence of respiratory
viruses (e.g., influenza) within the hospital. Reports of
increased hospital MRSA rates during outbreaks of
respiratory pathogens have been published [34,35]. In
the northern hemisphere, influenza season occurs from
October to March [36]. For 2009–2010, in addition
to the regular influenza season, the H1N1 influenza
pandemic was identified in Canada [37] and H1N1
patients were admitted to the participating facility. An
increase in the MRSA case rate may have occurred
as infection control activities and surveillance were
focused on influenza and away from MRSA [34],
reduced staffing as a result of illness, antimicrobial
prescribing practices [35] especially with fluoroquino-
lones which may have led to an increase in the risk for
acquiring MRSA [38], and environmental contamination
of MRSA which may have resulted in transmission events
among staff and patients.
The independent variable season was not found to be
significantly associated with the number of MRSA cases
in this hospital. Seasonal variation in MRSA is debat-
able with some studies documenting spring [39] or
summer [40,41] with increased MRSA rates. However,
in these studies, specific aspects of MRSA infections
(e.g., community-acquired, healthcare-acquired, severe
only) were investigated. A significant increase in the
rate of MRSA cases was observed specifically in the
months of March and April. As previously discussed,
an increase in the number of MRSA cases in March
may have been a result of the presence of influenza, or
other respiratory viruses, in the hospital.
Conclusions
The application of a temporal scan statistic to historical
data from a community hospital resulted in the identifica-
tion of several significant MRSA clusters. Further examin-
ation of these clusters revealed several events that may be
equivalent to MRSA outbreaks or transmission events that
were not recognized by hospital personnel. By adopting a
comprehensive approach for MRSA surveillance, clusters
were identified at the hospital, service, and ward levels.
Infection control efforts can be focused at one or more
levels to identify risk factors for MRSA acquisition and
transmission, establish interventions, and evaluate control
measures. The identification of specific time periods that
corresponded to significant increases in the rate of MRSA
cases in the patient population may have been correlated
with other determinants at the hospital level, including
the presence of other pathogens. In this investigation,
spa typing provided very little information due to the
presence of a predominant spa type. Therefore, the use
of a different typing technique (e.g., whole-genome
sequencing) or additional supplementary information
may be warranted to decipher transmission events and
clusters. Application of scan statistics for hospital surveil-
lance of MRSA would probably be most rewarding in
facilities with access to higher resolution molecular typing
data. Future research utilizing the temporal scan statistic,
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prospectively, with the application of molecular typing, es-
pecially whole-genome sequencing, to identify MRSA
clusters in real-time and elucidate transmission events in
the hospital setting, is warranted.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Univariable multilevel* negative binomial
regression analyses of variables associated with the rate of MRSA
cases.
Abbreviations
AIC: Akaike’s Information Criteria; CDIs: Clostridium difficile infections;
CI: Confidence interval; CMRSA: Canadian epidemic methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus; HA: Healthcare-associated; HAIs: Healthcare-associated
infections; IPC: Infection Prevention and Control; IRR: Incidence rate ratio;
MRSA: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus; MST: Minimum spanning
tree; n: Number of isolates; PVL: Panton-Valentine leukocidin; ST: Sequence type.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
MCF contributed to the design of the study, statistical and molecular
analyses, and drafting of the manuscript. DLP and OB contributed to study
design and statistical analysis. WAC contributed to study design and data
collection. RRS contributed to study design. JSW contributed to study
design and molecular analysis. All authors contributed to the editing and
final version of the manuscript.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank the study hospital, the Infection Prevention and
Control Department, microbiology laboratory personnel, and Barbara Merry
for research assistance. We would also like to thank Joyce Rousseau,
Terri Lowe, and Meagan Walker for laboratory assistance. The statistical
infrastructure for analyses was supported through a grant to D.L. Pearl
from the Canada Foundation for Innovation and the Ontario Research Fund.
Author details
1Department of Population Medicine, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario,
Canada. 2Infection Prevention and Control, Grand River Hospital, Kitchener,
Ontario, Canada. 3Department of Pathology and Molecular Medicine,
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. 4Department of
Mathematics and Statistics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada.
5Department of Pathobiology, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada.
Received: 4 March 2014 Accepted: 1 July 2014
Published: 8 July 2014
References
1. Köser CU, Holden MT, Ellington MJ, Cartwright EJ, Brown NM, Ogilvy-Stuart
AL, Hsu LY, Chewapreecha C, Croucher NJ, Harris SR, Sanders M, Enright MC,
Dougan G, Bentley SD, Parkhill J, Fraser LJ, Betley JR, Schulz-Trieglaff OB,
Smith GP, Peacock SJ: Rapid whole-genome sequencing for investigation
of a neonatal MRSA outbreak. N Engl J Med 2012, 366:2267–2275.
2. Huang SS, Yokoe DS, Stelling J, Placzek H, Kulldorff M, Kleinman K, O’Brien
TF, Calderwood MS, Vostok J, Dunn J, Platt R: Automated detection of
infectious disease outbreaks in hospitals: a retrospective cohort study.
PLoS Med 2010, 7:e1000238.
3. Craven DE, Shapiro DS: Staphylococcus aureus: times, they are a-changin’.
Clin Infect Dis 2006, 42:179–180.
4. Mellmann A, Friedrich AW, Rosenkötter N, Rothgänger J, Karch H, Reintjes R,
Harmsen D: Automated DNA sequence-based early warning system for
the detection of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus outbreaks.
PLoS Med 2006, 3:e33.
5. SaTScan software for the spatial and space-time scan statistic.
In http://www.satscan.org/.
6. Pearl DL, Louie M, Chui L, Doré K, Grimsrud KM, Leedell D, Martin SW,
Michel P, Svenson LW, McEwen SA: The use of outbreak information in
the interpretation of clustering of reported cases of Escherichia coli 0157
in space and time in Alberta, Canada, 2000–2002. Epidemiol Infect 2006,
134:699–711.
7. Guerin MT, Martin SW, Darlington GA, Rajic A: A temporal study of
Salmonella serovars in animals in Alberta between 1990 and 2001. Can J
Vet Res 2005, 69:88–99.
8. Sauders BD, Fortes ED, Morse DL, Dumas N, Kiehlbauch JA, Schukken Y,
Hibbs JR, Wiedmann M: Molecular subtyping to detect human listeriosis
clusters. Emerg Infect Dis 2003, 9:672–680.
9. Torabi M, Rosychuk RJ: An examination of five spatial disease clustering
methodologies for the identification of childhood cancer clusters in
Alberta, Canada. Spat Spatiotemporal Epidemiol 2011, 2:321–330.
10. Jennings JM, Curriero FC, Celentano D, Ellen JM: Geographic identification
of high gonorrhea transmission areas in Baltimore, Maryland. Am J
Epidemiol 2005, 161:73–80.
11. Goetghebeur M, Landry PA, Han D, Vicente C: Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus: a public health issue with economic
consequences. Can J Infect Dis Med Microbiol 2007, 18:27–34.
12. Kim T, Oh PI, Simor AE: The economic impact of methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus in Canadian hospitals. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol
2001, 22:99–104.
13. Kulldorff M, Heffernan R, Hartman J, Assunção R, Mostashari F: A space-time
permutation scan statistic for disease outbreak detection. PLoS Med 2005,
2:e59.
14. Public Health Ontario. In http://www.publichealthontario.ca/en/eRepository/
PIDAC-IPC_Annex_A_Screening_Testing_Surveillance_AROs_2013.pdf.
15. Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute: Performance Standards for
Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing;19th Informational Supplement M100-S19.
PA, USA: Wayne; 2009.
16. Shopsin B, Gomez M, Montgomery SO, Smith DH, Waddington M, Dodge
DE, Bost DA, Riehman M, Naidich S, Kreiswirth BN: Evaluation of protein A
gene polymorphic region DNA sequencing for typing Staphylococcus
aureus strains. J Clin Microbiol 1999, 37:3556–3563.
17. eGenomics. In http://tools.egenomics.com.
18. Ridom SpaServer. In http://www.spaserver.ridom.de.
19. Golding GR, Campbell JL, Spreitzer DJ, Veyhl J, Surynicz K, Simor A, Mulvey
MR, Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program: A preliminary
guideline for the assignment of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus to a Canadian pulsed-field gel electrophoresis epidemic type
using spa typing. Can J Infect Dis Med Microbiol 2008, 19:273–281.
20. Rankin S, Roberts S, O’Shea K, Maloney D, Lorenzo M, Benson CE: Panton
valentine leukocidin (PVL) toxin positive MRSA strains isolated from
companion animals. Vet Microbiol 2005, 108:145–148.
21. Tenover FC, Tickler IA, Goering RV, Kreiswirth BN, Mediavilla JR, Persing DH,
MRSA Consortium: Characterization of nasal and blood culture isolates of
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus from patients in United States
hospitals. Antimicrob Agents Chemother 2012, 56:1324–1330.
22. Dohoo IR, Martin W, Stryhn H: Model-building strategies. In Methods in
Epidemiologic Research. Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island: AVC, Inc;
2012:401–428.
23. Dohoo IR, Martin W, Stryhn H: Confounding: Detection and Control. In
Methods in Epidemiologic Research. Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island:
AVC, Inc; 2012:307–358.
24. StataCorp: xtnbreg. In Stata 10 Base Reference Manual. College Station,
Texas: Stata Press; 2007:317–327.
25. Hall AJ, Bixler D, Haddy LE: Multiclonal outbreak of methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus infections on a collegiate football team. Epidemiol
Infect 2009, 137:85–93.
26. Cuny C, Schassan HH, Witte W: Outbreak of nosocomial infections with
two different MRSA strains involved: significance of genomic DNA
fragment patterns in strains otherwise difficult to type. Epidemiol Infect
1993, 111:55–61.
27. Kuhn G, Francioli P, Blanc DS: Double-locus sequence typing using clfB
and spa, a fast and simple method for epidemiological typing of
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus. J Clin Microbiol 2007, 45:54–62.
28. Harris SR, Feil EJ, Holden MT, Quail MA, Nickerson EK, Chantratita N, Gardete S,
Tavares A, Day N, Lindsay JA, Edgeworth JD, de Lencastre H, Parkhill J, Peacock
SJ, Bentley SD: Evolution of MRSA during hospital transmission and
intercontinental spread. Science 2010, 327:469–474.
Faires et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2014, 14:375 Page 13 of 14
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/14/375
29. Harris SR, Cartwright EJ, Török ME, Holden MT, Brown NM, Ogilvy-Stuart AL,
Ellington MJ, Quail MA, Bentley SD, Parkhill J, Peacock SJ: Whole-genome
sequencing for analysis of an outbreak of meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus: a descriptive study. Lancet Infect Dis 2013, 13:130–136.
30. Kahl BC, Mellmann A, Deiwick S, Peters G, Harmsen D: Variation of the
polymorphic region X of the protein A gene during persistent airway
infection of cystic fibrosis patients reflects two independent
mechanisms of genetic change in Staphylococcus aureus. J Clin Microbiol
2005, 43:502–505.
31. Health Quality Ontario. In http://www.hqontario.ca/public-reporting/
patient-safety.
32. Health Quality Ontario. In http://www.hqontario.ca/public-reporting/
patient-safety/information-about-patient-safety-quality-indicators.
33. Daneman N, Stukel TA, Ma X, Vermeulen M, Guttmann A: Reduction in
Clostridium difficile infection rates after mandatory hospital public
reporting: findings from a longitudinal cohort study in Canada. PLoS Med
2012, 7:e1001268.
34. Chai LY, Ng TM, Habib AG, Singh K, Kumarasinghe G, Tambyah PA:
Paradoxical increase in methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
acquisition rates despite barrier precautions and increased hand
washing compliance during an outbreak of severe acute respiratory
syndrome. Clin Infect Dis 2005, 40:632–633.
35. Yap FH, Gomersall CD, Fung KS, Ho PL, Ho OM, Lam PK, Lam DT, Lyon DJ,
Joynt GM: Increase in methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
acquisition rate and change in pathogen pattern associated with an
outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome. Clin Infect Dis 2004,
39:511–516.
36. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. In http://www.cdc.gov/flu/
about/season/flu-season.htm.
37. Wilkinson K, Mitchell R, Taylor G, Amihod B, Frenette C, Gravel D, McGeer A,
Suh KN, Wong A, Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program:
Laboratory-confirmed pandemic H1N1 influenza in hospitalized adults:
findings from the Canadian Nosocomial Infections Surveillance Program,
2009–2010. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2012, 33:1043–1046.
38. Weber SG, Gold HS, Hooper DC, Karchmer AW, Carmeli: Fluoroquinolones
and the risk for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in hospitalized
patients. Emerg Infect Dis 2003, 9:1415–1422.
39. Monnet DL, MacKenzie FM, López-Lozano JM, Beyaert A, Camacho M,
Wilson R, Stuart D, Gould IM: Antimicrobial drug use and methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus, Aberdeen, 1996–2000. Emerg Infect Dis 2004,
10:1432–1441.
40. Van De Griend P, Herwaldt LA, Alvis B, DeMartino M, Heilmann K,
Doern G, Winokur P, Vonstein DD, Diekema D: Community-associated
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, Iowa, USA. Emerg Infect Dis
2009, 15:1582–1589.
41. Wiersma P, Tobin D’Angelo M, Daley WR, Tuttle J, Arnold KE, Ray SM, Ladson
JL, Bulens SN, Drenzek CL: Surveillance for severe community-associated
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infection. Epidemiol Infect 2009,
137:1674–1678.
doi:10.1186/1471-2334-14-375
Cite this article as: Faires et al.: The use of the temporal scan statistic to
detect methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus clusters in a community
hospital. BMC Infectious Diseases 2014 14:375.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Faires et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2014, 14:375 Page 14 of 14
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/14/375
